Poland has granted preliminary approvals for several locations, is considering multiple competing technologies, and has announced plans for dozens of small modular reactors. Yet not a single Polish SMR project currently has both a construction licence and secured financing. Moving from political declarations to an operating reactor will require progress across seven critical areas.

The most advanced proposal is the BWRX-300 project in Włocławek, being developed by ORLEN Synthos Green Energy. OSGE aims to commission the first unit in 2032. ORLEN itself is more cautious: its strategy envisages at least two reactors, with a combined capacity of 600 MW, by 2035.

Both targets remain technically possible, but neither is secured. Building Poland’s first SMR will require more than a promising reactor design. ORLEN and Synthos must settle their ownership dispute, the government must establish a long-term support mechanism, the European Commission must approve the state-aid package, the project must complete environmental and nuclear licensing, and the first BWRX-300 under construction in Canada must demonstrate that the technology can be delivered within a credible budget and schedule.

1. ORLEN and Synthos must resolve their dispute over control

Poland’s most advanced SMR programme is being developed by ORLEN Synthos Green Energy, a joint venture owned equally by state-controlled ORLEN and Michał Sołowow’s Synthos Green Energy.

The two partners contribute different resources. Synthos secured access to the BWRX-300 technology developed by GE Vernova Hitachi Nuclear Energy, established a relationship with the technology provider, and initiated the project’s early development. ORLEN brings a much larger balance sheet, major industrial assets and considerably greater financing capacity.

This complementarity was supposed to be the partnership’s main strength. Instead, it has become the source of a persistent conflict.

The first plant is planned for Włocławek, near ANWIL’s chemical facilities, which belong to the ORLEN Group. ORLEN is expected to hold a direct 80% stake in the special-purpose company responsible for the investment, while the remaining 20% would be held by OSGE. Once ORLEN’s 50% interest in OSGE is included, ORLEN’s effective economic exposure to the project would amount to approximately 90%.

At the same time, OSGE was expected to act as the project’s “General Partner”. The precise meaning of that role was not adequately defined. ORLEN therefore fears that it could finance almost the entire investment without exercising proportionate control over it. Synthos, meanwhile, does not want to be reduced to the role of a passive licence provider with limited influence over a project it originally initiated.

The conflict became particularly visible at the end of August 2026. OSGE did not have sufficient funds to pay licence fees owed to Synthos Green Energy for access to the standard BWRX-300 design. Synthos proposed that the shareholders either recapitalise OSGE or provide shareholder loans. ORLEN, however, wanted to link any new financing to an agreement over control of the Włocławek project.

Synthos ultimately postponed the payment deadline. This removed the immediate threat to OSGE’s liquidity but did not resolve the underlying dispute.

Before a credible final investment decision can be made, the partners must define who controls the project, who bears responsibility for cost overruns, and how the holder of the technology rights will be remunerated. In a multibillion-euro nuclear project, such matters cannot be left to interpretation once construction is already under way.

2. The government must create a viable financing mechanism

A nuclear power plant cannot be financed like a solar farm or a gas-fired power station. Most costs are incurred many years before the plant begins selling electricity, while every delay immediately increases the cost of financing.

This problem is particularly severe for the first reactor of a new design. Investors in the BWRX-300 cannot yet rely on a track record of dozens of completed plants. They must account for potential design changes, prolonged regulatory reviews and disruptions in a new supply chain.

Poland’s first SMR is therefore unlikely to be built on entirely merchant terms. OSGE has asked the Ministry of Energy to begin work on a contract-for-difference scheme covering 14 BWRX-300 units at three locations: Włocławek, Stawy Monowskie and Stalowa Wola.

A contract for difference stabilises the plant’s future revenues. The government and the generator agree on a strike price. When the market price of electricity falls below that level, the generator receives a top-up payment. When market prices exceed it, the generator returns the difference. This makes future cash flows more predictable for lenders and investors.

A contract for difference alone may not be sufficient. The first SMR projects will probably also require government guarantees covering part of the debt financing. Without them, the cost of capital could become so high that it would erase any savings resulting from the reactor’s smaller scale and potentially shorter construction period.

The government will therefore need to answer a difficult question: how should the risk be divided among taxpayers, electricity consumers, ORLEN and the private shareholder?

If investors transfer all cost-overrun risk to the state, the project will cease to resemble a market-based investment. If the government leaves all the risk with investors, the project may never secure affordable financing.

3. The European Commission must approve the state support

A guaranteed electricity price, state-backed loans and direct public recapitalisation may constitute state aid under European Union law. Poland will not be able to grant such support freely without agreeing its terms with the European Commission.

The notification process is not merely a formality. The Commission will examine, among other questions:

  • whether the support is necessary for the investment to proceed;
  • whether its scale is proportionate;
  • whether investors continue to bear a meaningful share of the risk;
  • whether the mechanism could generate excessive profits;
  • how the project would affect competition in the European electricity market.

Poland has already completed a similar procedure for its first large nuclear power plant on the Baltic coast. That experience may help the government prepare the SMR notification, but it does not guarantee approval. The OSGE case will involve the additional complexity of a private shareholder and a support request covering an entire fleet of reactors.

The Commission will want to know why support should cover 14 units, how the benefits will be divided between ORLEN and Synthos, and whether the proposed arrangement would give a single technology supplier a privileged position in the Polish market.

Only a positive Commission decision will allow the project to establish a stable long-term financing structure. Until then, the developer can continue preparatory and engineering work, but it will not be able to reach financial close for full construction.

4. The project must complete environmental and site-approval procedures

Polish public debate often treats a decision-in-principle as if it were almost equivalent to permission to build a nuclear power plant. In reality, it marks only the beginning of the administrative process.

A decision-in-principle confirms that a proposed investment is broadly consistent with national interests and energy policy. It allows the developer to seek further approvals, but it does not establish that the selected location satisfies all environmental and nuclear-safety requirements.

The Włocławek project will require detailed studies covering issues such as:

  • geological and seismic conditions;
  • access to cooling water;
  • flood risk and extreme weather events;
  • the plant’s impact on local ecosystems;
  • the ability to connect and transmit power through the electricity grid;
  • spatial planning and transport infrastructure;
  • possible transboundary environmental effects.

Some of these studies cannot simply be accelerated by political decision. Environmental observations must cover a sufficiently long period to capture seasonal variations.

The project will also require sustained support from the local community. Włocławek has several advantages: it is an established industrial location, already has relevant infrastructure, and could benefit from new jobs and investment. Even with strong local support, however, the developer must conduct proper consultations and provide credible information about safety, water use and emergency planning.

5. OSGE must satisfy Poland’s nuclear regulator

The most important approval will not be granted by ORLEN or by the government. It will come from the President of Poland’s National Atomic Energy Agency, or PAA.

The PAA has already issued a general opinion on the BWRX-300’s technological assumptions. This is a meaningful indication that the design may comply with Polish nuclear-safety requirements. A general opinion, however, is not a licence to construct a specific plant.

To obtain a construction licence, the investor will need to submit a complete design and a detailed safety analysis report. The documentation must demonstrate that the reactor will remain safe during normal operation, design-basis accidents, loss of power, extreme weather and other foreseeable events.

The BWRX-300 uses passive safety systems based partly on natural circulation and gravity. This reduces the number and complexity of some active systems. Nevertheless, the regulator will not accept a vendor’s general assurance that the design is “inherently safe”. Every relevant system and accident scenario must be documented, calculated and independently assessed.

Poland will be able to draw on documentation reviewed by the Canadian regulator. It cannot, however, simply copy the Canadian licence. The site conditions, legal framework, electricity system, investor organisation and some technical requirements will be different.

The PAA’s own capacity may become an additional constraint. The agency must prepare simultaneously to regulate the large Westinghouse plant planned on the Baltic coast and potentially several SMR projects. Without sufficient numbers of experienced specialists, licensing procedures could take longer regardless of the political timetable.

6. The first Canadian BWRX-300 must validate the technology

The most important test of Poland’s SMR programme is currently taking place not in Włocławek but at Darlington in the Canadian province of Ontario.

Ontario Power Generation is building the world’s first BWRX-300 there. The Canadian regulator granted a construction licence in April 2025, and the first unit is expected to enter operation around 2029–2030. The complete Darlington programme could eventually include four reactors.

For Poland, the Canadian project will provide crucial evidence. It will show:

  • whether the reactor can be built according to schedule;
  • how expensive the construction work proves in practice;
  • how many design changes are required;
  • whether modularisation genuinely simplifies delivery;
  • how quickly the cost of successive units falls;
  • what problems emerge during commissioning.

The budget for the four Canadian reactors is CAD 20.9 billion. The first unit and shared infrastructure are expected to account for approximately CAD 7.7 billion. These figures demonstrate that the first SMR will not be cheap.

The economic promise of SMRs rests on repetition. Subsequent units are expected to cost less because they use the same design, an established supply chain and experienced construction teams.

If Darlington is completed without major delays or cost overruns, Polish developers will find it easier to attract financing. If the project encounters problems typical of first-of-a-kind nuclear construction, lenders will increase the cost of capital, regulators may demand additional analysis, and the Polish timetable will move further into the future.

This is why the 2032 commissioning target is exceptionally ambitious. It leaves Poland very little time to incorporate Canadian experience before commencing full nuclear construction.

7. Poland must prepare its workforce, suppliers and infrastructure

A nuclear reactor cannot be built with a technology licence alone. It requires thousands of engineers, welders, operators, inspectors, designers and nuclear-quality specialists.

Poland has a well-developed energy, engineering and construction sector. Some Polish companies have already worked as subcontractors on foreign nuclear projects. Moving from supplying individual components to delivering an entire reactor, however, requires quality-control systems that comply with exceptionally demanding nuclear standards.

Poland will need to establish or expand:

  • training programmes for reactor operators and nuclear engineers;
  • supplier certification systems;
  • domestic maintenance and servicing capabilities;
  • supply chains for nuclear-grade components;
  • emergency-response capacity;
  • infrastructure for transporting and storing nuclear fuel;
  • arrangements for spent fuel and radioactive waste.

Because SMRs are intended to be deployed in series, the domestic industrial opportunity may eventually be greater than for a single large reactor. That opportunity depends on the existence of a credible order book. Companies will not invest in expensive certification and new production lines merely because developers have announced that 24 or 26 reactors might one day be built.

The SMR programme will also compete for specialists and contractors with the large nuclear power plant planned on Poland’s Baltic coast. If both programmes enter their main construction phases simultaneously, shortages of experienced personnel could become a major source of delay.

The mid-2030s remain the most realistic timeframe

Poland can build an SMR, and the BWRX-300 is currently the most likely technology to be selected. It is no longer merely a PowerPoint concept: the first unit is under construction in Canada. The Polish project, however, remains at a stage preceding a final investment decision.

Poland will almost certainly not have an operating commercial SMR by 2030. Commissioning the first unit in 2032 would require an almost flawless sequence of ownership negotiations, financing decisions, environmental procedures, licensing and construction. Nuclear projects rarely proceed without delays at every one of these stages.

A more realistic commissioning window is 2034–2037. Even that scenario requires ORLEN and Synthos to reach an agreement soon and the government to begin preparing a state-support mechanism without further delay.

The largest obstacle is no longer the reactor’s underlying physics. It is the ability of institutions and project owners to divide risk, responsibility and future returns. Only once those questions are settled will Poland’s first SMR cease to be a promise and become an actual investment.